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Abstract 
The Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto has been praised and often critiqued 
throughout its history for its capital infrastructure. There have been many written 
accounts about the Metropolitan Toronto and some have contained assertions on the 
history of capital infrastructure within the municipality. Yet, there has been not much 
literature directly devoted to explaining the entire history of capital infrastructure within 
Metropolitan Toronto. This paper attempts to extract some of the assertions made by 
key literature on Metropolitan Toronto and assess whether these assertions can be 
empirically supported. In order to do this, an analysis of all the annual Capital 
Operations financial statements of Metropolitan Toronto was undertaken. The historical 
analysis of the Capital Operations did support the assertions made by the literature on 
capital infrastructure, but there were a few exceptions. Exceptions included the province 
in the late 60's and early 70's reducing, not increasing, their funding to Metro, and 
provincial transfers in the late 70's to the end of Metro still being the number #1 source 
of financing for capital expenditures, despite trying to decrease its responsibilities to the 
municipality. 
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Introduction 
Much has been written on the history of the former Municipality of Metropolitan 
Toronto, but not specifically on the its historical trends in capital infrastructure. 
Metropolitan Toronto's capital infrastructure trends have for the most part, been 
contained in literature that did not directly deal with capital infrastructure. Within the 
literature, common themes of Metro Toronto have surfaced repetitively. One such 
theme is that physical infrastructure dominated the early years of Metro. One possible 
method in which these common themes could be supported or challenged would be to 
do an historical analysis of the Capital Operations financial statements for the 
Municipality of Toronto. 
The objective of this paper is to analyze the history of capital operations of the 
Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto (1954-1997), with respect to its Capital Financing 
and Expenditures, and compare the analysis against the written literature of the 
development of Metropolitan Toronto's capital infrastructure. 
First, capital infrastructure will be defined by reviewing several types of 
"infrastructure". Second, the importance of capital infrastructure to municipalities will be 
examined. Third, this paper will define some of the main terms used within municipal 
capital financing and expenditures. Fourth, an overview of the history of the Municipality 
of Metropolitan Toronto and a review of some of the key literature on the municipality in 
regards to capital infrastructure will be given. Fifth, Metropolitan Toronto's capital 
operations (1954-1997) will be analyzed. Finally, this paper will do a comparison 
between the reviewed written literature on Metropolitan Toronto, and the analysis of the 
Metropolitan Toronto's capital operations. 
Capital Infrastructure 
In order to understand the importance of infrastructure to a municipality, it first 
must be defined. However, there does not seem to be any universal term within the 
literature that accounts for all infrastructure within a municipality. For example, the terms 
public infrastructure, municipal infrastructure, hard and soft infrastructure, physical and 
social infrastructure, and capital infrastructure all appear to have overlapping definitions 
throughout the literature. Various definitions will be examined for a more thorough 
understanding of infrastructure which will be necessary later in the paper. 
In the book, Financing Infrastructure: Tools for the Future, authors Feldman, 
Mudge, and Rubin explain that infrastructure should be considered a service and is the 
basis of all economic activity. More specifically, it should be termed public works 
infrastructure because these facilities share common characteristics. Their definition 
includes roads, highways, bridges, water supply, sewage disposal, solid waste, public 
transit, airports, and seaports. Public works infrastructures tend to have long economic 
lives, dominate their local markets, interact with other infrastructure projects, and provide 
a return on investment in the economy. A major role is played by the public sector in the 
financing, owning and operation of the project or facility and can coordinate these 
projects as a part of the larger system. The public sector is also solely responsible for 
safety regulations since these projects have near monopolies in their local markets 
(Feldman, Mudge, and Rubin, p.3-5). 
The authors state that infrastructure can be viewed from two angles: physical and 
functional. The physical view believes that the decision makers provide infrastructure to 
remove existing deficiencies, meeting recurring problems, and providing the capacity for 
expansion. The functional view proposes that infrastructure is implemented to balance 
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population based needs against those required to produce goods and services (Feldman 
et. al, p.4). 
In the Toronto Dominion Economics Special Report, Mind the Gap: Finding the 
Money to Upgrade Canada's Aging Public Infrastructure, they defined public 
infrastructure as not all physical structures, but only the subset that delivers collective 
benefits to society. This definition includes public transit and transportation facilities, 
wastewater and water works, educational facilities, hospitals, recreation, electric power 
and shelter housing. Again, they explain that there is no widely accepted definition of 
what constitutes "public infrastructure (TD Economics, p.2)." The report also clearly 
delineates that this definition of infrastructure does not include human and software 
capital or other non-tangible assets (TD Economics, p.2). 
Expanding upon the previous definition of public infrastructure, Neil Grigg, in his 
book, Infrastructure Engineering and Management, states that public infrastructure does 
not only consist of the typical items such as roads, highways, bridges, water supply, 
sewage and waste disposal systems. It also includes airports, seaports, railways, 
buildings, energy production, transmission facilities, satellite, and fibre optic 
telecommunications which is needed for the passage of information in current times 
(Grigg, p.26). 
Max Neutze, in his book. Funding Urban Services, gives a more complex 
definition of infrastructure and sheds light on the differences between physical and social 
infrastructure. Neutze describes that infrastructure was: 
[first introduced in the early 1950's and was] predominantly used in 
developmental economics to mean 'social overhead capital,' which may be 
divided into economic overhead capital such as much of transport, energy and 
telecommunications which provides services to industry, and social capital such 
as education, police and health services which provides services to people 
(p.17). 
Physical, or sometimes known as economic infrastructure, is defined as providing 
services to property. These services are provided where people live and work, or 
provide links between where people work, live and carry out other social, economic and 
cultural activities. The services included in this definition entail water supply, sewerage, 
stormwater drainage, solid waste disposal, roads, public transport, electricity, gas and 
telecommunications. Social infrastructure provides services to people. Social 
infrastructure services are provided at particular locations to which users are expected to 
travel (p. 18). 
Hard and soft infrastructure is very similar to physical and social infrastructure in 
definition. The McMaster University Sustainable Communities Research Group defines 
both hard and soft infrastructure: 
Hard infrastructure consists of the physical aspects maintained by the public 
sector that are needed by the populace to carry out their daily routines. Hard 
infrastructure includes, but is not limited to, roads, sidewalks, water lines, and 
sewers. Soft infrastructure consists of the services, or buildings in which they are 
contained, provided by the public sector. Policing, schools and hospitals are 
examples of soft infrastructure (McMaster University Sustainable Communities 
Research Group website, http://www.eno.mcmaster.ca/civil/sustain/infill.htmn. 
Municipal infrastructure, as defined by the TheFreeDictionary.com; 
typically includes transportation, sewer, reservoir, potable water supply systems, 
police stations and local jails, and other infrastructural capital (e.g. tools, clothing, 
shelter, boats, etc.) - the built environment - under the jurisdiction of a municipal 
government or other local government (TheFreeDictionary.com, 
http://encvclopedia.thefreedictionarv.com/municipal%20infrastructure). 
A common thread throughout these definitions is that infrastructure falls under 
government jurisdictions, and is created to support services. According to Len Brittain, 
Corporate Director of Finance for the City of Toronto, based on the provincial jurisdiction 
within Canada, municipal services may include; 
1. Solid waste collection, disposal, and recycling; 
2. Emergency services: 
a. Policing, 
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b. Fire, and 
c. Ambulance 
3. Libraries, parks, and recreation; 
4. City planning and development 
a. Licensing, 
b. By-law enforcement, and 
c. Planning and development; 
5. Water and sewer services; 
6. Movements of goods and people: 
a. Transit and 
b. Roads; 
7. Economic development; 
8. Arts, culture, and heritage; 
9. Social and health services; 
a. Welfare, 
b. Homes for aged, 
c. Child care, 
d. Hostels, 
e. Supportive housing, and 
f. Public health (Brittain, p.553). 
Capital infrastructure plays a significant role in the provision of these municipal services. 
Taking into account these definitions, for the purpose of this paper, capital infrastructure 
will incorporate both the definitions of social and physical infrastructure, and 
encompasses all the provisions of the municipal services labeled by Brittain. 
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Importance of Capital Infrastructure: 
Now that municipal capital infrastructure has been defined, the next logical 
question is to ask why is it important to municipalities? It has been documented by 
public municipal officials and scholars that capital infrastructure may be the most critical 
issue facing local governments. 
According to the 2000 State of America's Cities Survey, U.S. city officials 
identified investing in infrastructure (67%) and in public education and other supports for 
children, youth and families (65%), as needing the most attention and resources from 
the federal government. Approximately ninety percent of these officials stated that there 
is a moderate to significant need for major repairs, replacement, and maintenance of 
their road infrastructures in their municipalities over the next five years. Other 
infrastructure concerns for these officials included work needed on sewer infrastructures 
(76%), water infrastructure (69%), and transit infrastructure (62%) (National League of 
Cities). Brittain states that if this same survey was performed in Canada, there would be 
similar results (Brittain, p.554). 
In fact, a similar Canadian study was conducted in 1984 by the Federation of 
Canadian Municipalities, who published the Report on Municipal infrastructure in 
Canada: Physical Condition and Funding Adequacy, in January, 1985. Initially, 
approximately 300 surveys where sent out to the mayors of municipalities throughout 
Canada asking about the status of their capital infrastructure over the past 15 years. In 
turn, about 98 municipalities replied to the study by the time of the publishing of the 
report. In total, these municipalities represented roughly 8.5 million people. The results 
of the survey indicated that many mayors felt that their community facilities were in 
relatively good condition, however, their hard infrastructure had deteriorated over time 
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(i.e. roads, bridges, sidewalks, sewers, watermains, and public buildings). In particular, 
sewage collection, water transmission facilities and road facilities were in need of 
emergency repairs (Federation of Canadian Municipalities, p.11). For these 
municipalities, the number one issue was funding. A study of the unadjusted per capita 
budget data for these municipalities for the past 15 years showed that public works 
budgets have been declining over those years (p.11). 
It has been suggested that there are major repercussions by not maintaining a 
municipality's capital infrastructure. For example, neglect or deferral of road 
maintenance can cause deterioration, increase the possibilities of transportation 
accidents, and pronounce the gridlock problem when major road arteries for the 
municipality are closed for construction. If bridges or buses do not receive regular 
maintenance necessary for their upkeep, health and safety are compromised. 
Additionally, if regular maintenance of buildings and vehicles is deferred, the costs of 
repair and maintenance will be increased. If this asset has deteriorated to the point of 
being non-repairable, the asset will most likely need to be replaced (Brittain, p.554). 
Economist D.A.L. Auld, in his article, "Financing the Provincial-Local Public 
Capital Infrastructure", explains why investments in municipal capital infrastructure are 
important: 
1. They produce consumption services; 
2. They enhance private sector output; 
3. They enhance labour productivity (Auld, p. 195). 
Another economist, Alicia Munnell, in her article, Policy Watch: Infrastructure 
Investment and Economic Growth, agrees with Auld as the following quotation 
illustrates; 
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Everyone agrees that public capital investment can expand the productive 
capacity of an area, both by increasing resources and by enhancing the 
productivity of existing resources. A well-constructed highway allows a truck 
driver to avoid circuitous back roads and to transport goods to market in less 
time. The reduction in required time means that the producer pays the driver 
lower wages and the truck experiences less wear and tear. Hence, public 
investment in a highway enables private companies to produce their products at 
lower total cost. ... Similar stories can be told for mass transit, water and sewer 
systems, and other components of public capital (Munnell, p. 191). 
Munnell's description of the benefits of a "well constructed highway" is a practical 
example of the importance of municipal capital infrastructure. As indicated by Munnell, 
other components of public capital could be explained as enhancing private sector 
output and enhancing labour productivity. 
Another benefit of investment in municipal capital infrastructure is helping to 
improve an organization's economic competitiveness. Brittain uses the example that "a 
well maintained vehicle fleet can enhance the organization's image and help to promote 
its services or products (Brittain, p.554)." For municipalities, reinvestment in capital 
infrastructure in such items as roads, transit, community centres, and social housing will 
enhance the municipality's image, allowing it to be more economically competitive and 
improving the quality of life (Brittain, p.554). Figure 1 displays how the City of Toronto 
views the benefits of reinvesting in capital infrastructure. 
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Figure 1 - Reinvesting in Our Communities, Infrastructure, Environment, and Economy 
Improves Quality of Life 
Enhanced quality of life 
Rcinnuin 
• community 
inframucnire/envnanmcnx 
• economy 
linjiiwcu economic 
competioveneu 
Source Qiy of Toronto, 73r.«f. <i At OonWr Sttfag Om Fmutrr 
(lbronu>: Cily of Iutcogd. June .000). 
An analysis of the empirical research of public investment and the rate of growth 
has been done by the OECD Group on Urban Affairs. It was their conclusion that there 
are not many rigorous attempts to establish a relationship between the two variables but 
did look at the research that did. The first study done by K. Mera, in his 1973 research 
titled "Regional Production Functions and Social Overhead Capital: An Analysis of the 
Japanese Case". The study attempted to find a relationship between regional 
productivity and the stock of public capital within Japan and the United States. He 
concluded that within the United States, between 1947 and 1963, the growth of public 
infrastructure was a major cause of more rapid growth of some regions compared to 
others. However, this was not the case in Japan although there were reasons given to 
why this was not the case (OECD Group on Urban Affairs, p.35). 
Another study analyzed by the OECD Group was by D. Aschauer in his 1987 
article, "Is the Public Capital Stock Too Low?" The study attempted to discover if there 
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was a relationship between public consumption and investment, private investment and 
the rate of return on private capital over the period of 1953-1984. The study concluded 
that the level of public capital strongly influences the net return to private capital (OECD 
Group, p.35). 
This section has introduced the importance of capital infrastructure to a 
municipality. Municipal public officials, leading academic scholars and empirical 
evidence have discussed the importance of infrastructure to municipalities. In addition to 
these sources, in Canada, the importance is reflected by both the Federal and Provincial 
Governments who have departments devoted to the production and maintenance of 
infrastructure (i.e. Infrastructure Canada, and the Ontario Ministry of Public Renewal). 
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Capital Financing and Expenditures 
In order to understand the historical analysis of the capital operations of the 
Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto's financial statements, many related terms need to 
be distinguished. Harry Kitchen's book, Municipal Revenue and Expenditure Issues in 
Canada, provides clear definitions. 
First, the term "capital" in various municipalities will be different than in others. 
Some "capital" will display characteristics of both operating and capital expenditures and 
this is where the differences come from. According to Kitchen, it is generally agreed that 
capital expenditures can be defined to include the following; 
1. Expenditure for the acquisition or construction of buildings, structures, 
facilities, equipment, rolling stock, or furnishings. 
2. Expenditure incurred in order to bring any of the foregoing items into 
operation 
3. Expenditure for a major rehabilitation of any of the foregoing items 
4. Expenditure for the purchase or development of land 
5. Expenditure for any good that normally has a useful life of more than one 
year (Kitchen, p.187-188). 
Furthermore, Kitchen explains that capital expenditures differ from operating 
expenditures in two important ways; 
1. Whereas operating expenditures tend to be more or less the same from one 
year to the next, capital expenditures tend to vary substantially and 
unpredictably. 
2. Second, operating expenditures are financed from locally raised revenues or 
grants, whereas capital expenditures derive financing from these sources but 
also from special assessments, development charges, reserves, and 
borrowing (p. 187). 
To simplify, municipal capital expenditures can be thought of as public 
investment into municipal capital infrastructure. Annually, municipalities will go through 
a process of financing and budgeting (planning) capital expenditures. The amount of 
expenditures depends on whether the municipality is in a development stage (e.g. 
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requiring new facilities, etc.) or in a mature stage. Municipalities in a growth stage will 
face a high level of capital expenditures because they will be building their municipal 
infrastructure (e.g. roads, sidewalks, water and sewage systems, parks, recreation 
centres, etc.). Municipalities at a mature stage will see increasing capital expenditures 
due to repair, rehabilitation and replacement of the municipal capital infrastructure 
(Whyte, p.81). 
Next we look at how capital expenditures are financed and how the decision is 
made of what public capital projects to invest in. In order to finance for capital 
expenditures, municipal governments use both internal and external sources of revenue. 
Internal Revenue Sources: 
Generally, municipalities in Canada have the following internal revenue sources; current 
operating revenues, reserves (reserve and reserve funds), a variety of special charges 
such as special assessments, development charges, and other exactions levied on 
developers, and a miscellaneous collection of other municipal generated revenues 
(Kitchen, p. 193). Definitions for these sources can be found in Appendix A. 
External Revenue Sources: 
Generally, there are two external revenue sources for municipalities. These sources are 
grants and borrowing. Refer to Appendix B for definitions. 
A major source of long term borrowing for municipalities is the public market in 
which the municipalities or the province-wide authority can issue two general variations 
of debentures; serial debt and sinking fund debentures. Serial debentures are issued for 
a number of years with a certain number of these debentures reaching maturity and are 
redeemed by the municipality each year. Serial debentures can take several forms. 
Annuity serials are like mortgages in that they provide for payments of interests and 
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principal that are typically the same throughout the lifetime of the debenture. In the early 
years of an annuity serial, the interest portion of the payment is larger than the principal. 
In the later years of this debenture, the principal payment becomes larger. Straight 
serials require annual principle payments of approximately equal amounts. The interest 
amounts decline over the term of the debenture. Irregular serials involve a "balloon 
maturity" date (i.e. repayment of a significant portion of the principal is postponed until 
the issue matures). Most provinces disallow this type of debenture, and when allowed is 
seldom used (Kitchen, p.206, 208). 
The second general types of debenture are sinking-fund debentures. A sinking 
fund debenture is issued to mature at a fixed future date. Every year the municipality 
pays an agreed upon sum to a trustee who in turn, invests the portion that is not 
immediately applied toward paying the debt or discharging the obligation. In general, 
municipal governments rely more on serial rather than sinking fund debentures because 
they are less difficult to administer (Kitchen, p.208). 
In Ontario, the province regulates which entities can issue long term debt. For 
example, regional municipalities, counties, and single tier municipalities not within an 
upper tier municipality can issue debentures. Additionally, most school boards (Metro 
Toronto school boards were an exception) have the power to issue their own 
debentures, but also have the right to ask the municipality in the same jurisdiction to 
issue debt on their behalf. Local boards such as public utilities commissions, libraries, 
and police departments can have the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) issue debt on their 
behalf, but must seek debentures through the area or regional municipality 
(Whyte, p.96-97). 
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Additionally, the Ontario Municipal Act requires that municipalities submit an 
application for the issuing of debentures for annual capital expenditures. The OMB 
undertakes a debt capacity calculation to see that the municipality does not exceed the 
prescribed limits (i.e. regional municipality 25%, area municipalities 20%). This 
regulation is to prevent a fiscal crisis or defaults (Whyte, p.97-98). Section 147 (4) (a-e) 
and (5) of the Act sets out the debt and financial obligation limits for municipalities 
(Appendix C). 
The OMB is a quasi-judicial administrative tribunal which adjudicates matters and 
disputes over urban and rural planning, public utilities, railways, public transit, 
transportation, public works and general municipal affairs. The OMB powers in regards 
to the approval of general municipal capital expenditures are found in The Ontario 
Municipal Board Act RSO 1990, Section 54 (1). Within Sections 55-70 of the same Act, 
the OMB's powers with regards to the issuing of debentures can be found. Section 65 
(1) to (8), dictates that all municipalities must have the Boards approval for all capital 
undertakings requiring the issuance of debentures or future financing beyond the term of 
council (Appendix D). 
A very important factor in long term borrowing for municipalities is the interest 
rate that is associated with the various types of debentures. The interest rate plays a 
crucial role in determining the type of financing that will be undertaken and its timing, 
and therefore the burden on the borrower. Due to this fact, the bond ratings of a 
municipality are very important. The bond ratings determine what the rate of interest a 
municipality will receive for its debentures. The bond rate is established by a major 
rating service (e.g. Moody's, Standard and Poor's, and Dominion Bond Rating Service). 
These organizations determine a municipality's bond rate through a detailed assessment 
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of a municipality's capacity to raise revenue under normal and abnormal economic 
circumstances. This bond issue is rated only in terms of a municipality's credit risk and 
not in terms of its investment merit. The highest ratings by the bond rating organizations 
are based on the credit quality and risk associated with the municipality's ability and 
willingness to repay the principal and interest in a timely manner. It is in the interest of 
municipalities to have the best bond rating because this will save the municipality money 
in repaying the debenture (Kitchen, p. 210). 
The second side of capital expenditures is the decision of what public capital 
projects will be invested in. Typically, a municipality will create a capital budget. A 
capital budget is a multiyear financial plan that lays out the timing for of construction or 
acquisition of capital works. This capital budget only takes into account the costs 
associated with the acquisition and rehabilitation of capital assets (p. 191-192). 
Requests for capital projects usually come from politicians, citizens, special 
interest groups, operating departments and central agencies. Evaluation of these capital 
projects are undertaken by central agencies that are coordinated by the municipal 
government. The majority of the information for the capital budget, such as the 
economic base and land use studies come from the planning department and the 
financial data will come from the finance or treasury department (Whyte, p.83-84). 
Various types of analysis both quantitative (e.g. cost benefit analysis, positive net 
present value) and qualitative, are performed to determine whether a capital expenditure 
should be undertaken. These analyses are beyond the scope of this paper. 
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History and Review of Literature on Metropolitan Toronto 
In January 1953, the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB), issued a report titled 
"Decisions and Recommendations of the Board", in respect to a previous application to 
the board by the City of Toronto and the Town of Mimico. The respondents comprised 
of the remaining eleven municipalities of the County of York. This application, first 
submitted in 1950, wanted the various municipal governments to amalgamate into one 
government, but only one municipality (i.e. Town of Mimico) agreed with this request. 
The report by the OMB rejected the City of Toronto's application. Instead, the Chairman 
of the OMB, Mr. Lome Cumming, Q.C., recommended that there should be a creation of 
a metropolitan government in the form of a two-tier system of local government (Rose, 
p.20-21). 
In February 1953, the Ontario provincial government introduced Bill 80, "An Act 
to Provide for the Federation of the Municipalities in the Metropolitan Area." Bill 80 
quickly passed as the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto Act of 1953. This act set up 
an interim metropolitan administration on April 15,1953, and lost the interim name on 
January 1, 1954 (p.21). 
Based on this act, the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto was formed. The 
Metropolitan Council consisted of twelve representatives from the City of Toronto, and 
one Mayor or Reeve from each of the other twelve municipalities that comprised this 
new government. The thirteen municipalities which were encompassed by this new 
higher level of municipal government were; Town of Leaside, Town of Mimico, Town of 
New Toronto, Town of Weston, Village of Forest Hill, Village of Long Branch, Village of 
Swansea, Township of East York, Township of Etobicoke, Township of North York, 
Township of Scarborough, Township of York, and the City of Toronto. The new 
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government would be lead by a Chairman. The first Chairman of the Metropolitan 
Council was Mr. Frederick Gardiner, who was the only Metro Chairman to be appointed, 
by the Provincial government, to that position. As of January 1,1955, any successors 
could be elected to the position of Chairman at the end of the term, either from within or 
external to Metro Council (p.21-22). 
There was now a separation of responsibilities between Metropolitan Toronto, 
and its constituent municipalities as laid out by the Act. Appendix E sites Metropolitan 
Toronto's responsibilities after the passing of Bill 80. 
Area municipalities were still responsible for: local water supply, local sewage 
collection, garbage collection, local streets and sidewalks, police, fire, education (above 
the level of metropolitan grants), some health and welfare services, housing and 
redevelopment, planning in conformity with metropolitan plan, creation and maintenance 
of local parks, and collecting revenues required to provide local services on the basis of 
the uniform assessment (p.26-27). In 1957, three new entities came under Metro 
Council control. The Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto Act was amended to 
amalgamate all thirteen police departments into one department under Metro. 
Additionally, the responsibility for licensing in all classifications throughout the 
municipalities was transferred to Metro, along with the Magistrates' Court from the City 
of Toronto (p.36-37). 
The next great stage in the existence of Metropolitan Toronto came from the City 
of Toronto pushing for amalgamation again in 1963. Instead of going through the OMB, 
as it did in 1950, the Ontario government decided to establish a Royal Commission, 
headed by Carl Goldenberg, Q.C., to explore the strengths and weaknesses of the 
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metropolitan system of government (Rose, p. 103). In June 1965, the Royal Commission 
submitted their recommendations to the Ontario government. On March 31,1966, Bill 
81, "An Act to Amend the Municipality of Toronto Act," was introduced to Queen's Park. 
It was formally passed on April 26,1966 to take effect January 1,1967. The two level 
form of municipal government remained, but now the thirteen municipalities had been 
consolidated into six municipalities (i.e. City of Toronto, Etobicoke, North York, York, 
East York, and Scarborough). At this time the structure of Metro Council was also 
changed. 
For the most part, Metro stayed the same except for some changes in the 
structure of Metro Council. In the 1997, the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto was 
consolidated into the City of Toronto, through the passage of Bill 103 (City of Toronto 
Act, 1997) in provincial legislature. As of January 1, 1998, the Municipality of 
Metropolitan Toronto existed no longer. 
There has not been a great deal of literature that has strictly dealt with the history 
of capital infrastructure in Metropolitan Toronto from its inception to its end. Instead, 
discussion of capital infrastructure has been included in various written accounts of 
Metropolitan Toronto. Key points are drawn from literature which illustrates issues 
surrounding capital spending in Metropolitan Toronto. 
In Governing Metropolitan Toronto: A Social and Political Analysis, 1953-1971, 
by Albert Rose, he writes that practically from the onset of Metropolitan Toronto, 
Metropolitan Council adopted the position that the government push forward building 
physical infrastructure (p.29). 
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The author believes that during the first decade, the lack of attention to social 
infrastructure was troubling, but probably inevitable. Rose explains that the combination 
of the various factors of population growth, urban development, and a substantial 
increase in housing stock, made it inevitable that the basic physical facilities would have 
to be greatly expanded (p. 126). Rose also states that during the mid 60's, Metro Council 
pushed for the main focus to be on social development, but for the remainder of the 
decade, social spending never attained the level that they had hoped for (p. 159). 
Urban Infrastructure and Urban Growth in the Toronto Region, 1950's to the 
1990's, by Richard White, looks at the historical relationship between the physical 
infrastructure and urban growth of Metropolitan Toronto and its surrounding regions. 
The author confirms that significant physical growth occurred during the first two 
decades of Metro (White, p. 18). According to White, most of the physical infrastructure 
created during this time Metro had to finance on their own. Metro did this by relying 
greatly on debenturing and was a heavy burden (p. 17). During the 60's, Metro was 
receiving Ontario grants larger per capita than any other municipality, but these were 
mostly directed towards social programs and not physical infrastructure (p. 16). 
In the 70's, political forces turned against the physical infrastructure of the past, 
and redirected spending towards public transit and higher density infrastructure. The 
new politics of this decade however did not affect environmental infrastructure 
(e.g. sewer systems, waterworks) (p.54). 
White distinguishes between two periods for physical infrastructure being built in 
Metro Toronto: the 1950's and 1960's (i.e. the golden age) vs. the 1970's onwards. The 
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first period is best characterized by expansive physical growth in Metro Toronto, strong 
population growth, little political opposition to growth, and a heavy reliance on 
debenturing. The second period is characterized by social and political opposition to 
growth, little population growth, the rise of regional governments outside of the Metro 
borders (p.66-67). 
In the "The Toronto Story: Sober Reflections on Fifty Years of Experiments with 
Regional Governance", by Frances Frisken, the author notes the history of Toronto's 
experience with metropolitan government and potential lessons learned from those who 
look to senior governments to solve regional problems. Frisken examines this study by 
using time periods. 
The first time period from the 50's to the mid 60's, was characterized by Metro 
by: providing new infrastructure to support urban development; Non residential 
assessment growing by 80% from 1954 to 1964; and Provincial government trying to 
introduce new grants. Metro was criticized during this period for not providing enough 
funding for public transit (Frisken, p.519-521). 
The second time period examined by Frisken, (mid 60's to 1975), was 
characterized by: an increase in the budget of transportation because conditional 
Ontario grants for subways was nearly entirely directed to Metro; more Ontario grants for 
Metro in the form of unconditional grants; and Metro reached a level of physical maturity 
(p.525-526). 
The third time period examined by Frisken, (1975 to 1995) began by the 
provincial government distancing themselves from municipalities. This was done partly 
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because of the increase of the provincial deficit and pressure from the public to curb 
spending. High inflation was also a contributing factor (p.527). The province also 
started to slowdown the policy of shifting transfers from conditional to unconditional 
(p.530). Complimentary to these actions, the province began to curtail the increases in 
grants to municipalities. The province still contributed to the capital costs of services, 
but for the most part these were not directed to Metro. The province had to reduce 
spending on municipalities further in the 90's due to the effects of the recession. 
International lenders and local taxpayers were putting pressure on the government to 
curb the increasing debt and deficit (p.530-531). 
The province provided municipal government with alternative methods to finance 
capital expenditures. One method they created was the Development Charges Act, 
1989. This allowed municipalities to expand their use of charges they placed on 
developers for municipal services (Frisken, p.532). 
Planning and Financing of Capital Works Programming in the Municipality of 
Metropolitan Toronto: a Case Study, is a thesis authored by Stephen Whyte. A section 
of this report goes through the history of Metropolitan Toronto and characterizes the 
various decades in what was accomplished in municipal infrastructure. 
The first decade (1953-1963), Whyte characterized as great in its progress in 
physical and social infrastructure (Whyte, p. 119-120). The second decade (1964-1973), 
Whyte explained as being one in which there was a continuation of growth related 
infrastructure projects and a mild increase in social expenditures (p. 119-120). The third 
decade (1974-1983), the author characterized as having slower economic growth, 
greater demand for social services, and increasing urban sprawl which increased the 
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cost of infrastructure. This decade was the end of massive infrastructure investments. 
There was very .imited growth during this time period which was marked with stagflation 
and two recessions. High employment and high interest rates led to increase in social 
expenditures to cope with these problems (p.123-124). The final decade (1984-1993) 
explained by Whyte had little investment in new infrastructure, but instead focused on 
the maintenance and rehabilitation of its infrastructure. Social expenditures dominated 
the bulk of Metro's operating budget (p. 124-125). 
At the beginning of the final decade (1984-1993) that Whyte reviews, Metro had 
started to come out of a recession and was strengthening itself as the financial and 
economic centre of Canada. Up until late 1990, Metro had high employment growth, 
high immigration and a reasonable level of high density residential development. 
However, little investment was made in new infrastructure; instead the focus was on its 
maintenance and rehabilitation. Social expenditures dominated the bulk of Metro's 
operating budget (p. 124-125). 
At the end of this decade, Metro Council was trying to find additional money to 
fund the $4.5 billion of capital expenditures from 1993-1997. Methods proposed to 
finance this infrastructure were through joint partnerships, and new types of bonds 
(Whyte, p. 126-127). 
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Analysis of Capital Operations of Metropolitan Toronto 
Metropolitan Toronto classifies capital expenditures in their financial statements 
as capital operations. In 1976, Metro Toronto implemented a Central Accounting, 
Budgeting and Management Reporting system to eliminate most of the independent 
accounting systems, previously maintained in each of the metropolitan departments and 
to provide a central collection focus for accounting data. At this time, they switched to 
the classification of capital operations from the formerly used, capital expenditures. This 
system was monitored by the Accounting Division of the Municipality's Treasury 
Department and by the Metropolitan Auditor. This analysis will cover the audited capital 
operations statements made in the Annual Reports by the Commissioner of Finance for 
the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto from 1954 to 1997. The capital operations 
consist of the various sources of financing for capital expenditures and the varied 
categories of expenditures made on capital items. Excluded from the capital operations 
and the analysis for this paper are education and waterworks. Metropolitan Toronto 
deals with those two operations separately. 
Under the various sources for financing capital expenditures, Metro Toronto used 
six categories: Ontario (Provincial) Grants, Canada (Federal) Grants, Reserves and 
Reserve Funds (Combined), Transfers from Current Operations, Long-Term Debt Issued 
(Debentures), and Other Financing. Before 1976, the municipality did not label these 
categories as such, therefore there are omissions to previous years in the categories of 
Reserves and Reserve Funds, and in Other Financing. For the other categories: Ontario 
Grants have been labeled from the inception of Metro, Canada Grants began to appear 
in the Capital Operations in 1994, Transfers from Current Operations started to appear 
in the financial statements in 1970, and Long-Term Debt before 1976 was calculated 
every year from subtracting the total Metropolitan Toronto Debenture Debt Issued from 
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the previous year with the total from the current year (this was found in the Debenture 
Debt section of the earlier financial statements). The figures for all of these categories 
from 1954-1997 can be found in Appendix F. 
Under the varied categories of expenditures made on capital items, there are 
eight categories: General Government, Protection to Persons & Property, 
Transportation, Environmental, Health, Social & Family, Recreation & Cultural, and 
Planning & Development. Before 1976, the municipality did not use label these 
categories as such, therefore, the previous years had to be re-categorized in order to fit 
into the various categories. In the earlier years, all the capital expenditures within 
Metropolitan Toronto were labeled individually within the financial statements. Based on 
this information, items (e.g. parks) which correlated to a specific category (e.g. 
Recreation & Cultural) were added to that category for the year. In the end, all the items 
that belonged to one category would then be added together and that would be the sum 
of the category for the year. The basis for the re-categorization of particular items prior 
to 1976 was based on the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto's Financial Information 
Return for the year ended December 31,1997. Within this document, a breakdown of all 
of the items that comprise the various categories was given. The figures for these 
categories from 1954-1997 appear in Appendix F. 
Additional information found in Appendix F includes the yearly Current Operating 
Expenses, the annual population of Metro Toronto, and the annual rate of inflation. The 
Current Operating Expenses and the population of Metro Toronto were located in the 
Annual Reports by the Commissioner of Finance for the Municipality of Metro Toronto, 
while the annual rates of inflation were located on the Bank of Canada website. 
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It is important to understand that this analysis was strictly drawn from the 
financial statements produced by Metropolitan Toronto, and does not include any capital 
budget information. This analysis was concerned with actual spending, and not planned 
projections. First, this analysis will go systematically throughout the various important 
categories in Appendix F with charts and tables, searching for any trends or peculiarities 
in the data. The remaining charts can be found in Appendix G. Following this, all 
conclusions based on the analysis will be presented. 
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Ontario Grants started at $2,156,061 in 1954 and ended with $304,377,000 in 
1997. Chart 1a demonstrates that the trend for Ontario Grants has progressively 
increased over Metro's history. Ontario considerably stepped up their grants to capital 
expenditures in the mid 70's, decreased in late 70's and early 80's. During the mid 80's, 
they increased their funding again, but then tapered off in the late 80's. Starting in the 
90's Ontario scaled up their transfers again. 
31 
Chart 1b - Ontario Grant* as P»ra»ntaa* of Total Plnanolno 
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Chart 1b data shows since 1976, when Metro Toronto starts to give accurate 
numbers for the total amount of capital financing received, Ontario Grants has been a 
considerable contributor to capital financing. During these years the lowest percentage 
was 26.5% in 1989. The chart demonstrates that during the years of 1979-1980, and 
1989-1993, the Ontario Grant percentage of total financing was lower historically than 
usual. In the early to mid 80's, the Ontario Grants were a significant portion of capital 
financing for Metro, and this recurred in the mid 90's. 
Chart 2a • Abaoluto Roaorvoa & Rosorvo Fund 
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Reserves and Reserve Funds were only categorized by Metro in 1976 (Chart 
2a). They increased from 1976 to 1997, but the growth in this category was not 
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consistent. Reserves and Reserve Funds dramatically increased in 1983, and between 
the years of 1989-1991. It appears that in the 1990's that this category increased 
significantly to the previous decades, not including the exception of 1983. 
Chart 2b - Ro«*rv«t & Raaarv* Fund a* P«re»ntaoo of Total Plnanolng 
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In contributing to total capital financing, Reserves and Reserve Funds according 
to the Chart 2b data did not have much impact throughout the 70's and moving into the 
early 80's. In 1983, this source jumps to 10%, but immediately tapers off to 5% or under 
for the next five years. Then all of a sudden, this category becomes a major source of 
financing for Metro in 1989, pushing over 15% plus for the next three years. After this, 
as a percentage of total capital financing, the category decreases but still is maintained 
at a higher level than the earlier years. 
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Chart 3a • Absoluto Currant Operating Fund to Capital Transfers 
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Current Operating Fund transfers were compiled from Metro's capital operations 
starting in 1970. In absolute terms, Transfers from the Operating Fund consistently 
progressed in value every year until the end of Metro. The only exceptions to this were 
1982 and the early 90's. 
Chart 3b • Current Operations Transfers as Percentage of Total Financing 
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The data in Chart 3b reveals that during the early 70's, this category was a large 
percentage of total financing. In the late 70's this percentage dropped significantly and 
rose again in 1980. Throughout the 80's, the percentage hovered around 25%, but 
beginning in 1991, the percentage dipped under 20% and stayed there until the 
termination of Metro. 
Chart 4a - Absolut* Long T*rm O«bt 
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According to Chart 4a, Long Term Debt Issued became marginally larger in the 
1950's and early 60's but shot up significantly in 1964 to approximately $73 million. 
From that point, this category steadily trended down until its bottom in 1968. From that 
point, again the absolute figure of long term debt issued rose until they made significant 
jumps in debt issued in 1976 and 1977. After this point until the mid 80's, long-term debt 
issued decreased, but jumped back up again in 1986, and with a few exceptions has 
steadily increased until the end of Metro. 
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Chart 4b - Long Torm Dobl liiuod »• Porcontao* of Total Financing 
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Again, this data only commences in 1976. Looking at the trend, in the mid 70's, 
Long Term Debt Issued accounted for over 40% of total financing. As the late 70's came 
around, the percentage started to decrease and in the first half of the 80's, its highest 
was 15%. It rose in the mid 80's and decreased again during the years of 1988-1990. 
During the 1990's, Metro became more reliant on this type of financing again, as the 
numbers soared again, but not to the level of the mid 70's. 
Chart 5 - Othor Financing as Porcontage of Total Financing 
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Although this category at times accounts for a large percentage of financing, 
particularly in the late 70's to 1990, it is difficult to conclusively assess this category 
(Chart 5). One question about this category is, did Metro include Canadian Grants in 
this category before 1994? Based on the Financial Information Return for the year 
ended December 31, 1997, this category includes: prepaid special charges, proceeds 
from the sale of land and other capital assets, investment income from own funds and 
other, donations, and other contributions and recoveries. In the 1990's, this source of 
financing was very minimal. 
Chart 6a - Total Financing for Capital Expenditures 
Although Chart 6a begins in 1954, the numbers may not be accurate until 1976. 
From 1976 until the end of Metro total financing moved up in what could be described a 
stair type fashion. The chart shows that this category dipped from 1978-1983, and then 
continuously rose with minor setbacks in 1984,1988,1990,1992, and 1994. Based on 
the chart, it does not appear to have any significant increases in this category. 
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Chart Sb - Yearly Paroantaga Changa In Total Capital Financing 
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This chart demonstrates the percentage change per year of Total Capital 
Financing. Again, the figures from 1954 to 1975 may not be accurate, but were still 
included in the chart. Chart 6b uses the annual rate of inflation as a barometer against 
the increases in total capital financing. The yearly change in inflation was taken from the 
Bank of Canada's CPI calculator located on their website 
(http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/rates/inflation calc.htmh. Analysis of the mid 70's 
shows that total capital financing rose significantly greater than inflation, although 
inflation was more significant than any previous time in Metro's history. From the late 
70's until the mid 80's, total capital financing changed very minimal and in fact, 
decreased in the 1978 and 1980. At the same time, inflation was increasing at a faster 
rate. In 1983, Metro increased their total financing and was much higher than the rate of 
inflation. Over the course of the mid 80's to the early 90's, there was a continual battle 
in which one year total capital financing would increase higher than inflation, and then 
vice versa. Towards the mid 90's, total capital financing stabilized, and increased 
greater than inflation. 
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Chart 7b - Oonoral Oovornmont Psroontago of Total Capital Expenditures 
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Based on Chart 7b in 1954, General Government accounted for nearly 8% of 
total capital expenditures, and then for over the next three decades did not even account 
for 1%. In 1988, the category jumped up to 16% of total capital expenditures. For the 
next four years, the category stayed historically much higher as a percentage of total 
capital expenditures. Starting back in 1993 and until the end of Metro, the total capital 
expenditure percentage of this category hovered around 2%. 
Chart O« - Absolut* Rrotsotlon to Paraom & Property Capital Bxpandltur** 
The overall trend for this capital expenditure has been progressively upward. 
The chart 8a illustrates that between 1954 and 1982, this expenditure stayed in a range. 
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In 1984, this expenditure broke out of this range and reached a peak in 1987. 
Expenditures tapered off in the 90's but never sunk to the pre-1983 levels. 
Chan Bb - Protection to Paopto & Property as Porcontago of Total Capital expenditures 
Chart 8b displays that increases in the percentage of this expenditure were 
clumped together three noticeable peaks. The first peak is in 1956, the second peak is 
in 1965, and the final peak came in 1986-1987. For the majority of Metro's history, 
expenditures in this category did consistently stay in the single digits for total capital 
expenditures. 
Chart 9a - Absolute Transportation Capital Expenditures 
OOO.OOO. OOO 
500.000.000 
400.000.000 
300.000.000 — 
200.000.000 
40 
Chart 9a shows a continual rise in expenditures on transportation throughout 
Metro's history. Notable mild dips occurred during the mid 60's to the mid 70's, and the 
early 80's. Beginning in the 90's, expenditures in this category escalated tremendously. 
Chart Sb - Transportation Expenditures as Poreontago of Total Capital Expenditures 
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The first observation that stands out from Chart 9b is its significance in the make 
up of total capital expenditures. Its lowest percentage of total capital expenditures was 
roughly 38% in 1958. A notably high percentage period was the early 60's. Particular 
low percentage periods were the late 50's, mid 70's, and the late 80's and early 90's. 
Chart 1Oa - Absolute Environmental Capital Expenditures 
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Chart 10a shows that this capital expenditure stayed in a range under $20 million 
until 1973. From this point, Metro kept raising capital expenditures until the late 70's. 
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Beginning in the early 80's, the absolute amount of expenditures in this category 
decreased. In 1983, there was an extraordinary jump in this category's capital 
expenditures. After 1983, this category dipped down in the rest of the 80's. For the 
period of 1989-1991, the category's expenditures soared. Starting in 1992, this category 
began to decrease again, bottoming out in 1994. From this point until the end of Metro, 
the category expenditures of this category relatively stabilized. 
Chart 10b • Environmental Expenditures as Percentage of Total Capital Expenditures 
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Similar to Transportation expenditures, Chart 10b shows that Environmental 
expenditures were a large percentage of total capital expenditures. In particular, the late 
50's was a time period in which this category was a major portion of total capital 
expenditures. The lowest period of Environmental expenditures occurred during the mid 
60's. From the mid 70's onwards, for the most part, this category hovered over 15%. 
Exceptions to this were the early and late 80's, and mid 90's. 
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Chart 12a - Absolute Soeial & Family Capital Expondituros 
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Chart 12a displays that this category stayed in a tight range, roughly under $3.5 
million, until 1972. From 1972 to 1985, another range is formed which stays under $7.5 
million. In 1987, this category then skyrockets to almost $17million. For the next few 
years expenditures level off approximately around $15 million. In 1990, the category 
dips down under $10 million, but quickly rises over the next few years nearly to a peak of 
$25 million in 1993. The trend over the end years of Metro descends downwards but still 
stays above $17 million for the duration. 
Chart 12b - Social & Family as Poroontago of Total Capital Expondituros 
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Chart 12b illustrates that this category hit its peak within the early years of Metro 
(i.e. 1955) at over 12% of total capital expenditures. During most of the 1960's, this 
category was at its lowest point as a percentage of the total capital expenditures. 
Another low period for this category as a percentage of total capital expenditures was 
the mid to late 70's. However, for the most part, this category is very stable over the 
lifetime of Metro Toronto staying consistently between 2% and 4% of total capital 
expenditures. 
Chart 13a • Absolute Rooroatlon & Cultural Expondlturos 
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Chart 13a shows three different time periods in the history of Recreational & 
Cultural expenditures in Metro. The first time period existed from 1954 to 1971. The 
absolute amount stayed under $5 million. The next period existed from 1972 to 1994. 
The absolute expenditure range for this category was $10 million to $22 million. From 
1995 onwards, Metro significantly increased the expenditures of this category until its 
end. 
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Chart 13b - Recreation & Cultural as Porcontago of Total Capital Expenditures 
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The pattern of Recreation & Cultural capital expenditures as a percentage of 
Metro's total capital expenditures resembles the shape of a V in Chart 13b because of 
the three peaks at the beginning, middle and end. The first peak over 10% occurs in 
1956. Then the category tapers down to below 5% for the late 50's, 60's, and the early 
70's. Then in the mid 70's, this category peaks to over 15% in 1974. For the remainder 
of the 70's, this category stays between 5% and 10%. Throughout the 80's and early 
90's, this capital expenditure flat lines around the 5% mark. During the end years of 
Metro, this category surges up to its highest percentages ever at nearly 22% in 1996. 
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Chart 15a shows that there has been a continual progress of Total Capital Expenditures 
for Metro. In 1964, this category hit a peak and then retreated for the rest of the 60's 
and early 70's. Not until 1974 was it able to pass the peak of a decade earlier. This 
category rose during the mid 70's, but then retreated during the late 70's and early 80's. 
In 1983, this category surged upwards and basically minus a few blips there has been 
an increase in total capital expenditures until the end of Metro. 
Chart 1Bb - Poroontage Change in Total Capital Expenditures Par Year 
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Chart 15b shows the percent change in Total Capital Expenditures from the 
previous year. The annual inflation rate was included in this chart to use as a barometer 
to see if the percent change was in fact more than the cost of living. As noticed by this 
chart, the 50's and the early 60's, with the exception of 1959, have significantly 
increased greater than the rate of inflation. Starting in the mid to late 60's, the trend 
reversed. During this time, the percent change per year was decreasing and rate of 
inflation was higher. During the early to mid 70's, again the trend shifted to percent 
change for this category being positive and exceeding the rate of inflation. Starting in 
1977 and continuing to 1981, with the exception being 1980, the percent change of total 
capital expenditures were negative and did not exceed the rate of inflation. Starting in 
1982, until the end of Metro Toronto, percent change in Total Capital Expenditures were 
46 
generally positive and exceeded the rate of inflation. Of particular note, Metro had five 
years when the percent change in Total Capital Expenditures reached 50% and over. 
The majority of these years came within the first decade of Metro. 
Chart 16 • Absolute Currant Operating Expenditure* 
For the majority of Metro's history, Current Operating Expenditures (absolute 
number) increased every year according to Chart 16. As the chart displays there is a 
slow change yearly until the early 70's when the trend starts to become steeper. The 
trend starts to accelerate more in the 80's and in the 90's the trend starts to become 
more vertical than horizontal. In the last few years of Metro, this category starts to 
flatten out and actually dips in the final year (1997). At the beginning of Metro, current 
operating expenditures were only $18,632,194. In 1995, this category reached 
approximately an astronomical $4 billion. 
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Chart 16b • Capital Expenditures As A Percentage of Operating Expenditures 
120 0% 
100.0% 
Illllllllllll 
Year 
Chart 16b compares the Capital Expenditures and Operating Expenditures, 
historically, of Metro. The trend shows that during the early years of Metro, capital 
expenditures were very comparable to operating expenditures. Most interestingly, in 
1959, Capital Expenditures exceeded Operating Expenditures for Metro. From that point 
on Metro's capital expenditures decreased in comparison to its operating expenditures. 
There was a slight surge in the early 70's in capital expenditures as a percentage 
reaching over 40%. However, since the mid 70's with a few exceptions, capital 
expenditures as a percentage of the operating expenditures have drifted around the 20% 
level. 
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Chart 17a - Total Capital Expenditures Per Person 
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Chart 17a represents the Total Capital Expenditure per Person in Metro. This 
figure was calculated by taking the total capital expenditure for Metro for the particular 
year and then dividing that by the population of Metro for that same year according to 
the Annual Reports. An added comparison to the total capital expenditures per person 
was the total capital expenditures per person based on inflation from the baseline year of 
1954. The chart demonstrates that capital expenditures, in absolute terms, rose 
significantly through the history of Metro. At the beginning of Metro, the sum was $4.56 
per person, and when it ended, the sum was $279.16. According to the base standard 
of inflation from 1954, by starting with $4.56 in the same year, in 1997 that figure would 
be $29.47. The actual capital expenditures per person increased much greater than the 
rate of inflation through Metro's history. 
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Chart 17b - Paraantaga Chang* In Capital Cxpandlturas Par Parson 
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Chart 17b encapsulates the periods in which Capital Expenditures per Person 
either increased or decreased in comparison to the previous year. The early 50's was a 
time in which the percent change per person was most significant. Other periods in 
which there were increases in capital expenditures per person were the early 60's, mid 
70's, the 80's and 90's with the exceptions of 1981, 1984, 1992, and 1993. Periods in 
which there was a decrease in the Capital Expenditures per Person were the late 60's to 
the early 70's, and the late 70's. 
Table 1a - Absolute Figures of Sources for Capital Financing per Decade 
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Table 1b - Ranking of Sources of Financing per Decade (Absolute Amounts) 
Table 1a (i.e. the absolute figures) and 1b (i.e. ranking of absolute figures in 
comparison to the other categories) examine the various sources of capital financing for 
Metro by the decade. Of note, the data for the various categories is not conclusively 
correct before 1976. Through examination of both Table 1a and 1b, starting with the 
70's, it is observed that Ontario Grants was the most significant source of financing for 
Metro. The next great source of financing was Long Term Debt Issued. Following these 
two sources of financing, the other categories were Transfers from Current Operations, 
Other Financing, and Reserves and Reserve Funds, respectively. In the 80's, the 
rankings stayed relatively the same, except that long term debt issued and transfers 
from current operations switched places. However by observing at the absolute 
numbers for the sources of financing, in this decade, Ontario Grants, and Reserve and 
Reserve Funds increased significantly (taking into account that the 70's was an 
abbreviated decade for some sources of financing). In contrast, long term debt issued 
decreased over 25%. In the 90's, the rankings were shifted somewhat because of the 
addition of Canada Grants to the sources of financing. Ontario Grants still remained as 
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the largest provider of financing capital expenditures in Metro. Long term financing 
returned to being the second largest source of financing in Metro. Additionally, the 
category nearly tripled in absolute figures from the previous decade. Transfers from 
current operations stayed relatively stable from the previous decade. Reserves and 
Reserve Funds ranked #4, but again, there was a substantial increase in the absolute 
amount the category provided to Metro. Canada Grants were the next largest source of 
financing for Metro. The last category for a source of financing for Metro, Other 
Financing, ranked last at #6, down from the previous decade. Most notably, this 
category decreased drastically from the previous decade, and nearly to the absolute 
levels of the 70's. 
Table 1c - External vs. Internal Sources of Financing (Absolute & Percentage) 
Table 1c examines the difference between Metro's external and internal sources of 
financing per decade in absolute and percentage totals. In the late 70's, external 
sources were three times the size of internal sources. Moving into the 80's, it seems 
that Metro made an effort to try to balance the number between external and internal 
sources. External financing was only 16% higher than internal financing. In the 90's, it 
appears as if Metro reverted to depend more on external financing that it had done in the 
80's. The separation between external and internal financing increased to 34%. 
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Table 2a - Absolute Figures of Capital Expenditure Categories per Decade 
Table 2b - Ranking of Capital Expenditure Categories per Decade (Absolute Amounts) 
Through examination of Table 2a and 2b, a few trends are noticeable. First, 
glaringly noticeable is that Transportation and Environmental categories were dominant 
in Metro's capital expenditures through the decades, ranked #1 and #2 respectively 
throughout. The General Government category was non-existent for much of the early 
53 
history of Metro. However, beginning in the 80's, expenditures increased dramatically 
for the duration of Metro and propelled it to rank #4 in both the 80's and 90's. The 
Protection to Persons & Property category historically ranked in the middle of the 
categories. This category's expenditures increased notably during the 80's. Health 
expenditures have been very minimal over Metro's duration. Historically, in absolute 
expenditures, Health received major increases in the 60's and 80's, but has remained in 
the lower ranking of expenditure categories. The Social & Family capital expenditure 
category in absolute figures made significant gains every decade. However, its ranking 
out of all capital expenditure categories remained in the lower tier. The Recreation & 
Cultural category has historically ranked in the middle. In observing the absolute figures 
there are some trends of particular interest. In the 70's and 90's, Metro stepped up the 
expenditures of this category. However, in the 80's, expenditures in this category 
decreased. This is peculiar due to the fact that all the other major categories increased 
expenditures dramatically in comparison to the previous decade. The final category 
Planning & Development was perennially at or near the bottom category of capital 
expenditures and in absolute terms there is not much to say other than it was a very 
minimal amount. 
Table 2c - Physical vs. Social Capital Expenditure (Absolute & Percentage Amount) 
Table 2c displays the absolute and percentage amounts by decade for physical 
and social capital expenditures in Metro. Physical capital expenditures included the 
following categories: Transportation and Environmental. Social capital expenditures 
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included the following categories: Protection to Persons & Property, Health, Social & 
Family, and Recreation & Cultural. The categories of General Government and Planning 
& Development were excluded from this analysis due to the fact that it was not clear as 
which expenditure type they were. 
Throughout the decades, the physical capital expenditures have dominated 
capital expenditures in Metro. The largest disparity between the two types of 
expenditures was during the 60's where social capital expenditures did not even equal 
double digits (9%). It appears that Metro made an effort in the 70's to increase social 
capital expenditures and kept roughly the same percentage in social and physical 
expenditures for the duration of Metro. 
This paper will now discuss the conclusions that have been made from the 
analysis of the capital operations. Total capital financing for Metro has steadily 
decreased since the mid 70's. Metro placed less value on capital expenditures in the 
latter years of Metro in comparison to the early years. 
Metro has relied heavily on external sources of financing for its capital 
expenditures. Potentially, due to the high inflation rates of the 70's, Metro tried to move 
away from relying on external sources of financing in the 80's. However, in the 90's, 
Metro again increased its reliance on external sources for financing capital expenditures. 
In the first two decades of Metro, long term debt issued was the primary source 
of financing for Metro. In both decades, this source of financing was more than double 
the amount of financing that Ontario Grants. Metro relied heavily on debenturing within it 
early existence. In the 70's, Metro went through a shift in policy towards debentures. 
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Relatively speaking, Metro debentures became slightly less than Ontario Grants. This 
indicates that, Metro possibly during this decade became more conscience of debt. As 
mentioned previously, the high levels of inflation and presumably, the high interest rates, 
created a deterrent against using debentures as the primary source of financing for 
capital expenditures. Additionally, this decrease in debenturing could have been 
mandated by the provincial government. Within the 80's, Metro's direction on long term 
debt issued was entrenched as it now dropped to the third largest source of financing. 
Even without taking inflation into account, its absolute sum was over $100 million less 
than the previous decade. However, in the 90's Metro shifted direction again in relation 
to debenturing. Metro increased long term debt issued tremendously during this decade. 
Potential reasons for this may include that transfers from operating revenues, senior 
governments, and other financing were not keeping pace with the needs for capital 
expenditures. 
After the first two decades, transfers from senior governments, particularly 
Ontario Grants, was the primary source of financing for the municipality. The provincial 
government has stepped up its funding every decade to finance Metro, but dramatically 
did this during the 60's and 70's. Funding in those decades more than doubled the 
previous decade. It appears that during the 80's and 90's, the provincial government 
slowed down transfer payments to the municipality because the increases in funding 
were much smaller than the previous decades. In particular, the Ontario government did 
this in the 90's to a larger extent. Even when stating this, the provincial government did 
not scale back funding lower than previous levels. It would be unfair to characterize the 
Ontario government as scaling back their transfers to Metro. Based on the data, the 
provincial government may not have increased funding much in the 80's and 90's, when 
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taking inflation into account, but they definitely did not decrease the real amount of 
grants. 
Starting in the 80's, based on the data, Metro Council made a decision to 
increase its internal sources of financing. The most notable increase in internal sources 
resided in Reserves and Reserve Funds. However, ultimately this category does derive 
from Metro's Operating Revenue. This increase in Reserves and Reserve Funds could 
also be a result of being mandated by the provincial government to accumulate a set 
amount of funds into this category. The shift to gaining more revenue from internal 
sources demonstrates that Metro Council was probably concerned about its historical 
dependence on external sources of financing and wanted it curtailed. 
Another issue that Metro faced from the mid 70's is that unexpended capital 
financing was on a downtrend to the end of Metro. At one point, Metro was in a yearly 
surplus in capital financing, but by the mid 80's, Metro found itself perpetually in the 
negative. Potentially, Metro might have lost some of their credit standing because of this 
negative downturn and the new found bad habit of increasing the expended capital 
financing. 
Capital expenditures have been important in the existence of Metro. At the 
beginning of Metro, capital expenditures were above 60% of the total of Metro's 
operating expenditures. As Metro progressed, capital expenditures became significantly 
less important and this ratio leveled off to approximately one-fifth. However, total capital 
expenditures per person in Metro increased. Metro increased spending per person, 
even when taking inflation into account. However, this trend slowed down in the mid 
80's. Additionally, percentage change in total capital expenditures continually slowed 
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down from the early years. This further lends evidence that capital expenditures did not 
remain as important to the municipality as it did in its early years. 
Metro capital expenditures have been predominantly on physical infrastructure. 
In fact, in the early years in which the physical capital expenditures dominated, the 60's 
was more heavily directed towards physical capital expenditures than the 50's. In the 
70's and onwards, it appears as if Metro Council moved towards a policy of incorporating 
more social capital expenditures into the municipality. Still yet, physical capital 
expenditures still lingered around 80% of the total of capital expenditures. 
58 
Comparison of Literature Review and Capital Operations Analysis 
In most cases, the Metropolitan Toronto capital operations data collected and 
analyzed in the charts and tables supports the written literature on the municipality that 
this paper covered in respect to capital infrastructure. 
The literature speaks greatly to the emphasis on physical infrastructure in the 
early two decades of Metro Toronto, which is supported by the financial statements. 
Interestingly enough, it was during the 60's in which physical infrastructure was the 
highest percentage of capital operations, and not the 50's, the decade in which 
Chairman Gardiner, a strong advocate of the implementation of physical infrastructure, 
led Metro Council. 
The literature also illustrates that social infrastructure was neglected during first 
two decades. The literature puts forth that there was a push to increase social 
development in the 60's, but it never reached the level projected. Again, the analysis 
supports the literature. Social infrastructure was a small percentage of total capital 
expenditures during the 50's and 60's. An interesting point that was brought out by 
White in his research was that in the 60's, Ontario increased grants to Metro directed 
towards social programs. If this was the case, not much of this funding trickled from the 
operating expenditures to the capital expenditures for social development during this 
period. 
It was noted that during that between 1954 and 1964, non-residential 
assessment increased by 80%. However, in examining the capital operations of Metro 
during these years, there was little mention of much funding coming from the Current 
Operating Fund or Reserves or Reserves Funds. The only mention internal sources of 
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financing from Metro Toronto were its annual Special Levy for Capital Works and to 
relieve debenturing that was equivalent to 2 mills. This was allocated from Metro's 
Current Tax Levy. It appears that this increase in assessment did not provide significant 
aid to Metro to finance capital expenditures. 
Following from this is the literature highlighting Metro's dependence on Long 
Term Debt Issued. The analysis bears this to be true. The absolute figures of 
debenturing during the 50's and 60's, absolutely dwarfs Ontario Grants, the only other 
financing source analyzed during this period. Beginning in the 70's and onwards, the 
dependence on debenturing never returns to the same levels of the 50's and 60's. 
Stated in the literature, during the mid 60's to mid 70's, Metro Toronto received 
the majority of the available funding from the Provincial government for subway 
development. However, the analysis of the capital operations does not indicate that the 
transportation expenditures became a greater percentage of total capital expenditures. 
In fact, it appears to have declined slightly from the early 60's. Potential explanations for 
this could be that the increase in provincial transfers was still insignificant in comparison 
to the total transportation expenditures, or Metro decided to decrease the amount of 
debenturing they did for subway development because of the transfers from the 
provincial government. 
Also mentioned in the literature was that during this same time period, Ontario 
started to send more grants in the form of unconditional transfers. The analysis of the 
capital operations does not bear these transfers becoming sources of financing for 
Metro's capital expenditures. There was an increase in the absolute figure of Ontario 
Grants in the mid 60's but this figure declined and did not rise again until the mid 70's. 
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Another point brought out by the literature was that environmental expenditures 
(e.g. sewer systems), was not affected by the new political battles that began in the 70's. 
The analysis provides evidence that that assessment is correct. As a matter of fact, 
environmental expenditures rose during the 70's as a percentage of total capital 
expenditures. 
The time period from the mid 70's to mid 80's was characterized by slower 
economic growth, greater demand for social development, and the end of massive 
infrastructure investments. The analysis supports the slower economic growth of the 
Metro, which translated into slowing down its total capital expenditures. The data shows 
that during this time period, the percent change in total capital expenditures per year 
was for the most part negative and was lower than the yearly inflation rate. The analysis 
also supports the greater demand for social development, as the percentage of social 
capital expenditures increased in the 70's and 80's. The type of analysis completed in 
this paper was not able to discern whether the 70's brought about the end of massive 
infrastructure investments. However, an assumption can be made that 15 to 20 years 
after these projects have been implemented in Metro Toronto, they may have started to 
deteriorate. If this was the case, capital expenditures would have to be devoted to 
maintaining and rehabilitating the capital infrastructure. This assumption would explain 
the data from the analysis that although there was a decrease in the absolute figures of 
total capital expenditures, it was not spectacular enough a reduction to deem capital 
expenditures were severely cut. 
Also mentioned in the literature was that the provincial government started to 
distance themselves from its municipal governments. They did this by curtailing 
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increases in grants and finding new methods for municipalities to obtain funding for 
capital expenditures. For the most part, the analysis agrees with this assessment of the 
provincial government. Definitely, in the 80's and more so with the 90's, Ontario 
curtailed increases in the transfers to Metro. However, Ontario Grants remained the 
greatest contributor to capital financing for Metro through the 70's, 80's, and 80's. 
Additionally, internal financing increased during the 80's and 90's. A potential 
explanation for this could be that the new methods the province provided Metro to find 
additional sources of revenue, could be an explanation for the increase in Transfers from 
Current Operations and from Reserves and Reserve Funds in the 80's and 90's. 
A final point put out by the literature was that social expenditures were increased 
in the early 80's and early 90's because of the symptoms of a recession (e.g. high 
unemployment, high interest rates). In the social capital expenditure categories of 
Protection to People & Property, Social & Family, and Health, this assessment appeared 
to be correct. The social expenditures of the current operating fund were able to trickle 
down to the capital expenditures for these categories. For the social category of 
Recreation & Cultural, capital expenditures decreased within these time periods. 
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Conclusion 
This paper has attempted to review several secondary sources of literature on 
the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto. These literatures focus on the history, in 
respect to capital infrastructure, of Metro Toronto. A comparison was performed 
between the literature and the capital operations of the municipality from 1954-1997. 
Through analysis of the actual financial figures produced by Metro Toronto throughout its 
history, the paper was then able to assess whether the assertions made from the various 
publications supported by these financial statements. It has been concluded that the 
analysis conducted in this paper supports most of the assertions made by the literature. 
Areas in which the analysis did not entirely support the literature included Ontario Grants 
actually decreasing in absolute values during the late 60's and early 70's, and although 
the provincial government may have started to distance itself from the municipal 
governments starting in the mid 70's, Ontario Grants still accounted for the majority of 
revenue for Metro in the 70's, 80's, and 90's. 
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Appendix A 
Current Operating Revenues - This is simply transferring funds from the Current 
Operating Revenues to the Capital Operations of a particular municipality. Municipalities 
often use this revenue for capital assets with a short life expectancy (i.e. police cars or 
fire engines), or for recurrent expenditures (i.e. maintenance or upgrading of sidewalks, 
roads, parks, etc.). Frequently the decision to use operating revenues depends on the 
level of capital assistance in the form of grants from senior governments (i.e. federal and 
provincial). If the senior government grants account for a large percentage of the capital 
expenditures, then the net cost of the expenditure may be low enough to allow it to 
finance the rest with the current operating revenues. Municipalities may use a capital 
levy to generate revenue for their capital projects. It involves the assignment of revenue 
generated from a few percentage points of the property tax rate (generally 2, 3, or 4 
points/mills) to a capital fund (Kitchen, 193-194). 
Reserves and Reserve Funds - Municipalities are able to finance capital projects 
through use of reserves (i.e. funds that are set aside in a separate fund but that the 
municipality may spend as it chooses) and reserve funds (i.e. funds that are set aside in 
separate funds and must be spent on specific projects). Instead of borrowing to finance 
capital expenditures, the municipality annually sets aside a portion of the current 
revenue in an interest bearing account, from which it eventually supplies some or all of 
the funding for a specific capital project. Reserves funds may be obligatory or 
discretionary. The disadvantage of reserve funds is that they violate the principle of 
intergenerational equity, in that the current taxpayers have to pay for future generations 
will use (Kitchen, 194-195). 
Special Charges - There are three categories of special charges; 1) special 
assessments and local development charges, 2) Development charges or lot levies, and 
3) other exactions such as density bonusing schemes, linkage fees, and parkland 
dedication schemes. 
1. A special assessment is a specific charge or levy that is added to the existing 
property tax on residential or non-residential properties in order to pay for 
additional or improved capital facilities that border on those properties. The size 
of the charge is based on a specific capital expenditure in a particular year, but 
the costs may be spread over a number of years. These charges do not 
generally contribute significant sums of revenue to local budgets, but are still 
important way of financing local improvement projects. A local improvement 
charge is one in which a municipality assigns a charge according to the assessed 
values of properties that abut on a local improvement project (Kitchen, p. 195-
196). 
2. Development charges is a specific dollar value per lot or per acre/hectare that a 
municipality imposes on a developer to finance the offsite capital costs of a new 
development. This charge typically only applies to the capital costs of facilities 
necessitated by new development, but in special circumstances it can also apply 
to additional capital costs needed to service redevelopment. Generally, they 
have been used in the past to finance hard services (i.e. water supply systems, 
sewage treatment plants, truck mains, and roads) (Kitchen, p. 196-197). 
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3. Other Exactions 
a. Density bonusing is when a municipality grants developers increase 
density allocations or density transfers in return for creating subsidizing 
housing, establishing day-care centres, restoring historic buildings, or 
other services (Kitchen, p.200). 
b. Parkland dedication may occur in some municipalities in which a 
Provincial Act requires developers to set aside land within the 
development, or elsewhere, for parks. However, the developer and the 
municipality may instead agree to a cash payment equal to the market 
value of the stipulated amount of land, and then the municipality may 
spend these funds in any fashion it so chooses (Kitchen, p.201). 
Other internally generated revenues for a municipality may include revenue held over 
previous periods, proceeds from the sale of fixed assets, investment income, private 
donations for specific capital projects, and various smaller items. The sum of these 
revenues is typically very small (Kitchen, 202). 
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Appendix B 
Grants - These come from the senior governments. Over time they have become less 
important as a source of funding for municipal capital projects. Provincial grants are 
generally intended to fund environmental projects and to a lesser extent, transportation 
projects (Kitchen, p.202). As well, these grants also fund education and 
communications capital projects as well (Whyte, p.90). 
Borrowing - Borrowing can come in the form of short-term, and to a greater extent, 
long-term. It plays a major role in municipal capital financing but their access to the 
capital markets is often provincially controlled. However, this is not the case in Ontario. 
Regional governments (e.g. Metropolitan Toronto) are able to borrow on behalf of the 
municipalities that encompass it (Kitchen, p.202-203). Yet there are still controls on how 
much these regional governments can borrow according to Provincial statutes. 
The decision to borrow is generally favoured when current revenues (property taxes and 
user fees) are insufficient to fund large expenditures on a "pay as you go" basis (Kitchen, 
p.205). "Pay as you go" is a technique where part of the capital program is funded out of 
current revenue. It is used to reduce the amount of debt issued and avoid a future 
increase of debt charges (Whyte, p.85). Capital expenditures tend to be lumpy. A 
municipality may find it needs millions of dollars to finance an infrastructure project in 
one year and then nothing for several years. Borrowing allows a municipality to smooth 
the payment from taxpayers over time (Kitchen p.205). 
1. Short-term borrowing - A municipality might use short-term borrowing either to 
finance capital expenditures or to cover an unexpected deficit in its operating 
budget (in which case, the deficit must be eliminated by budgeting for sufficient 
revenue in the ensuing year) (Kitchen, p.202). This type of borrowing can be 
done in various forms, including bank loans, the issuance of bills, certificates, or 
notes that are sold to banks or other investors. Short-term borrowing is 
sometimes used to finance capital projects with relatively short life expectancies. 
However, its most frequent use is for the purpose of financing a small series of 
small projects until the municipality can consolidate the projects and refinance 
them through longer term debt (Kitchen, p.204). 
2. Long-term borrowing - For municipalities this is completely restricted to financing 
capital expenditures alone (Kitchen, p.202). Municipalities borrow directly from 
private lenders, from other governments, from provincial or federal departments, 
agencies, or corporations that provide funds for specific projects (Kitchen, p.204). 
Long term financing in Ontario is considered to be quite complicated. Regional 
municipalities have been given the responsibility of borrowing for the lower tier 
municipalities within its jurisdiction. Smaller municipalities (i.e. not within a 
regional government) have also been given the power to issue their own debt. 
However, these municipalities outside the region generally have lower credit 
ratings than the larger sized municipalities and therefore the cost of servicing 
debt is higher for these municipalities. The effect has been that many of these 
smaller municipalities outside the regions simply do not have the capacity to 
borrow at all (Kitchen, p.204). 
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Appendix C 
Section 147 (4) (a-e) and (5) 
(4) Regulations - The Lieutenant Governor in Council may make regulations 
prescribing debt and financial obligations limit for municipalities, including; 
a. prescribing the amount to which the debts, financial obligations and liabilities 
to which the limit applies and prescribing the matters to be taken in account in 
calculating the limit; 
b. prescribing the amount to which the debts, financial obligations and liabilities 
to which the limit applies and prescribing the matters to be taken in account in 
calculating the limit; 
c. requiring a municipality to apply for approval of the Municipal Board for each 
specific work, the amount of debt for which when added to the total amount of 
any outstanding debt, financial obligations or liability under clause (a), causes 
the limit under clause (b) to be exceeded; 
d. prescribing rules, procedures and fees for the determination of the debt, 
financial obligation and liability limit of the municipality; 
e. establishing conditions that must be met by any municipality or class of 
municipalities before undertaking any debt, financial obligation or liability of 
class thereof. 
(5) O.M.B. approval not required - Section 65 and 66 of the Ontario Municipal Board 
does not apply to any debt, financial obligation or liability defined under clause 
(4) (a) if it does not cause the municipality to exceed the limit prescribed under 
clause (4) (b) 1992, c 15, s 8 (2). 
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Appendix D 
The Ontario Municipal Board Act, RSO 1990 
Section 65(1) (a-e) and (3) ©: OMB Approval and Debt Capacity Limits 
65. - (1) Despite the provisions of any general and special Act, a municipality may not, 
a. authorize; or 
b. exercise any of its powers to proceed with; or 
c. provide any money for, any undertaking, work, project, scheme, act, matter or 
thing, the cost or any portion of the cost of which is to be, 
d. raised in a subsequent year or years; or 
e. provided by the issue of debentures, until the approval of the Board has first 
been obtained. 
(3) c. to incurring a liability a debt, financial obligation or liability referred to in clause 
147(4)(a) of the Municipal Act which does not cause the municipality to exceed 
the limit referred to in clause 147(4)(b) of that Act. RSO. 1990, c 0.28, s.65 (3); 
1992, c.15s.9O 
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Appendix E 
1. Water Supply - Construction and maintenance of pumping stations, treatment plants, 
trunk mains, and reservoirs for the wholesale distribution of water to all the 
municipalities. 
2. Sewage Disposal - Construction and maintenance of trunk sewer mains and sewage 
treatment plants to provide a metropolitan sewage disposal system capable of 
accepting sewage on a wholesale basis from the area municipalities. 
3. Roads - The designation of highways as metropolitan roads, and the establishment 
of an arterial system of highways. Financing to be evenly split with the province. 
4. Transportation - The former Toronto Transportation Commission became the 
Toronto Transit Commission, with responsibility for public transportation throughout 
the metropolitan area. 
5. Education - The Metropolitan School Board was given responsibility for coordinating 
educational facilities in the metropolitan area, and charged with paying a grant to 
each of the 13 local school boards. 
6. Health and Welfare - The Metropolitan Council was given responsibility for the 
provision of homes for the aged, the maintenance of wards of Children's Aid 
Societies, post-sanatorium care for tuberculosis patients, and hospitalization of 
indigent patients. 
7. Justice - The Metropolitan Council must provide and maintain a courthouse and jail. 
8. Housing - The Metropolitan Council was given all of the powers of a municipality in 
the fields of housing and redevelopment. 
9. Planning - The Metropolitan Planning Board was created, with authority extended 
beyond the metropolitan area, encompassing all adjoining townships. It was charged 
with preparing an official plan for this larger metropolitan planning area. 
10. Parks-The Metropolitan Council was empowered to establish metropolitan parks. 
11. Finance and Taxation - The Metropolitan Council was made responsible for the 
uniform assessment of all lands and buildings in the 13 municipalities. On the basis 
of the total assessment, the requirements of the metropolitan government are levied 
against each Area Municipality at a uniform mill rate. The local government then 
collects the metropolitan tax requirement, as well as its own requirement, from its 
taxpayers. All responsibility for debenture financing was given to Metro to exercise 
both for itself and on behalf of any local government in the area. Moreover, the 
Metropolitan Corporation was required to assume the school debenture debts of 
each municipality, and acquired all assets of the local municipalities needed for 
metropolitan services (Rose, p.25-26). 
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Appendix G 
Chart 7a - Absolute Gonoral Oovommont Capital Expondlturos 
Chart 7a shows that this category starts as a blip in 1954, and really does not 
have much activity until the early 80's. For the record, this category was not classified 
until 1976, therefore in the re-categorization that was done with capital expenditures 
before 1976, some capital items possibly might not have been placed appropriately into 
this category. However, great lengths were taken to make sure that capital items were 
placed in the correct category. The guideline for the re-categorization was with the 
breakdown of Metropolitan Toronto's financial statements in 1997. As noted previously, 
activity in this category starts to increase during the 1980's and then in 1988 significantly 
increases. After 1988, capital expenditures in this category remain relatively high, but 
then decreases in the mid 90's. 
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Chart 11a illustrates that in the early 60's there was some spending in health. 
From the mid 60's to the mid 70's there was practically no expenditures in this category. 
Starting in 1976, expenditures in this category rose to over $1 million. After 1979, 
expenditures in this category relatively stayed above $2 million, but achieved new peaks 
in 1980, 1987, 1988, and 1993. Interestingly in the mid 90's, expenditures in this 
category decreased dramatically to absolute levels below what was being spent in the 
late 70's. 
Chart 11b - Hoalth Expondituros as Porcontago of Total Capital Expondituros 
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Chart 11b points out two major clusters in which health capital expenditures made an 
impact on Metro's total capital expenditures. Notably, the greatest impact that this 
category ever had on the total capital expenditures of Metro was in the early 60's. When 
money started to be spent again on health capital expenditures in the mid 70's, only 
twice did this category ever reach 3% of total capital expenditures. This occurred in 
1980 and 1993. This category did not have a significant impact on total capital 
expenditures, but maintained a consistency of approximately 1 % of total capital 
expenditures starting in the mid 70's until the end of Metro. 
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Chart 14a does not show very discernable trends other than there are pockets of 
significant activity during the late 60's, late 70's, and the 90's. Only three years (1966, 
1991, and 1993) has the capital expenditures of this category ever been over $1 million. 
Interestingly enough, in 1967, a year after significant expenditure in this category, there 
was a deficit in its capital expenditure by $364,763. This is exception is probably due to 
the perceived excessive spending for the capital category from the previous year. 
80 
Chart 14b - Planning & D«v*lepm*nt •■ P*ro*nt*o* off Total Capital expenditure* 
I o.a^h 
■ ■i ■_! 
• • I 
Chart 14b shows periods in which this category actually made a blip in total 
capital expenditures. However, as evidenced by the chart, only in 1966 did this category 
even make-up over 1% of total capital expenditures for Metro. The category has been 
quite insignificant in the make-up of Metro capital expenditures. 
